
Vance v. Ball State
University: Who is a Supervisor?
Under Title VII, employers may be
strictly liable for harassment by a “supervisor.” Employers may also be liable for harassment
by a co-worker, but only if the company knew or should have known of the
co-worker’s conduct and failed to take prompt and appropriate corrective
action. A question that remained disputed until the
Vance decision was who qualified as a supervisor under Title VII.
The Plaintiff in this case was a catering
assistant in the Ball State University Dining Services Department Banquet and
Catering division. She alleged that
another Ball State employee, a catering specialist, had created a racially
hostile work environment. The Plaintiff sued
Ball State University for workplace harassment by a supervisor. The Plaintiff argued that because the
catering specialist could direct her day to day work, the catering specialist was
a “supervisor” for purposes of Title VII.
The Court rejected this argument
and held that, to be a supervisor for purposes of Title VII, a person must have
the power to take a “tangible employment action” against the targeted
employee. According to the Court, someone
must be able to “effect a significant change in employment status, such as
hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits” to
qualify as a supervisor and create strict liability for an employer.
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar: What is the Standard of Proof for Retaliation Claims?
At issue in this case was the standard for proving retaliation in a Title VII case. The Plaintiff, a former faculty member at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center, alleged that he was denied a job because he had written a prior resignation letter in which he alleged race discrimination in the workplace. The University argued that, regardless of any retaliatory intent, the University had legitimate business reasons for opposing the hiring of Plaintiff by a hospital that had a staffing agreement with the University. The question before the Court was whether the plaintiff had the burden of proving that retaliation was a “motivating factor” in the decision not to rehire him, or whether he had the greater burden of proving that “but for” unlawful retaliation, he would have been hired.
Some history provides important
context for this question. In 1991,
Congress amended Title VII to establish the level of proof necessary to prove
discrimination in violation of the statute. After the amendment, employees
needed to show that the discrimination was a “motivating factor” in the
employment decision in order to recover. Once an employee establishes that race was a motivating factor, the
burden shifts to the employer to show that it would have taken the same action
anyway. This is a lower standard of
proof than that applied by the Court in other areas, such as age discrimination
under the ADEA, where “but for” causation is required.
The question in University of Texas Southwestern Medical
Center v. Nassar was whether the “motivating factor” analysis applied to a
claim of retaliation (as opposed to a claim of discrimination) under Title
VII. The Supreme Court held that the
“motivating factor” analysis does not apply to a claim for retaliation. Rather, “Title VII retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for causation, not the lessened [motivating factor] causation test.”
The impact of these decisions,
which are considered employer-friendly, will be widely felt. There were vigorous dissenting opinions filed
in both cases, and most likely there will be some strong disagreement with the
decisions. Congress may step in and change the result with new
legislation. We will all be watching
closely to see the reaction to today’s decisions.
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